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INTRODUCTION 
“We are the 99%!  We are the 99%!”  This quote has become the 
rallying cry of the Occupy Wall Street movement, which has spread 
across the globe.1  The Occupy Wall Street movement has highlighted 
the wealth discrepancy in the United States and the factors that led to 
the Great Recession.2  Simultaneously, the subject of white collar and 
 
* Professor of Law, Charlotte School of Law.  Professor Jordan previously served as 
an Assistant United States Attorney and as an Associate Counsel for the Iran/Contra 
prosecution.  The views expressed in this article are hers, and not the views of the 
Department of Justice.  Thanks to Andrea E. Patterson for her able research assis-
tance for this article, and the Charlotte School of Law for their research stipend in 
support of scholarship. 
 1. Occupy Wall Street started as a grassroots movement on September 17, 2011 
in New York. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org (last visited Jan. 24, 
2012).  “Occupy Wall Street is a leaderless resistance movement with people of many 
colors, genders and political persuasions. The one thing we all have in common is that 
We Are The 99% that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%.” 
Id.  The movement has since spread to almost 1000 cities and more than 80 countries 
worldwide. See Michele Kinama, Occupy Wall Street Summary, ACRONYM (Oct. 25, 
2011, 9:00 AM), https://acronym.imsa.edu/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-summary. 
 2. The U.S. economy sank into the Great Recession in December 2007 and end-
ed in June 2009, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Henry S. 
Farber, Job Loss in the Great Recession: Historical Perspective from the Displaced 
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corporate crime has escalated in recent years.  Criminal justice policy 
and focus has turned the public’s attention toward this field of law, 
raising numerous concerns about fairness within the criminal justice 
system.  The way white collar offenders are investigated, charged, 
prosecuted, and sentenced demonstrates a dual system of justice that 
many view as unfair.  As the rich get richer, the poor do indeed get 
prison.3  The discrepancies in the treatment of various types of crimes 
raise fundamental concerns about our definitions of crimes and our 
reasons for punishment. 
In Part I, I explain the historical underpinnings of white collar and 
corporate crimes and why this category of criminal activity was 
viewed and treated differently within our criminal justice system.  
Part II examines the economic disparities within the criminal justice 
system that flow from our perceptions of who the offenders are and 
what type of criminal activity is being committed.4  Not only are the 
“Occupiers” on Wall Street angry at economic inequity, but many of 
them believe the government should be more aggressive in prosecut-
ing the crimes perpetrated by the Wall Street elite.  Part III demon-
strates why language matters in our discourse on crimes.  The way we 
define criminal conduct affects the public perception which, in turn, 
can affect the way that legislators enact statutes, the way that prose-
cutors exercise discretion, and the way judges sentence criminals. 
Part IV looks at mortgage fraud and how this type of fraud is at the 
heart of the economic meltdown and current fiscal crisis.  Part V 
compares the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s and points out that 
the government response was much more aggressive than what we are 
witnessing today with the financial meltdown.  Part VI points out that 
the victims of mortgage fraud suffer many of the same harms as do 
victims of drug distribution networks.  Instead of funneling resources 
into a War on Drugs, perhaps we should focus on a War on Greed.  
Finally, I propose that we should discard the language of white collar 
and corporate crime if it means that we will treat mortgage fraud 
more seriously.  I posit that the mortgage fraud crisis should be 
viewed under the lens of the criminal law standards rather than civil 
remedies.  By shifting our language, we can place mortgage fraud in 
 
Workers Survey, 1984–2010 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7040, 2011). 
 3. See JEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER, AND THE POOR GET PRISON: 
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (9th ed. 2010) (describing some of the an-
ger expressed about criminal justice discrepancies, some of the same concerns moti-
vating the Occupy Wall Street movement). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
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the context of “real” crimes and deal with these widespread offenses 
in the serious manner that they deserve.  This change can result in a 
shift in government resources, much as we did to fight the War on 
Drugs in the 1980s.5 
I.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF CORPORATE AND WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME 
The treatment of criminal activity where the offender has no mind 
to think (no mens rea) and no body to act or imprison (no actus reus) 
in the corporate arena explains some of the historical roots of our ap-
proach to addressing crimes in the white collar field.  Since the corpo-
ration does not “fit” into the common law definition of a criminal, 
courts and the legislature initially excluded corporations from the 
scope of criminal actors or activity.  This view began to change in the 
early part of the last century, but we maintain these vestiges of dis-
parate treatment today.  By common definition, the field of white col-
lar crime encompasses both corporate crimes and individual crimes 
perpetuated within and outside of corporate structures.6 
In the 1909 case of New York Central & Hudson River Rail Road 
Company v. United States (N.Y. Central),7 the Supreme Court first 
tackled with the concept of holding a corporation criminally liable for 
the harm it caused.  In N.Y. Central, a railroad company and its em-
ployees were convicted of violating the Elkins Act after regulating the 
rates common carriers could charge.  In extending the tort doctrine of 
respondeat superior to a criminal case, the Supreme Court rejected 
two arguments advanced by the railroad company: that the conviction 
would harm or punish innocent shareholders and that the conviction 
was improper because there was no evidence that the board of direc-
tors authorized the actions.8 
At the time of the decision, corporations were commonly viewed as 
incapable of committing crimes and were subjected to only civil fines 
for violations.9  These violations were used to hold corporations ac-
countable for harm caused by their actions and omissions or on the 
basis of strict liability.  For the first time, the Supreme Court held that 
 
 5. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 6. See J. KELLY STRADER & SANDRA D. JORDAN, WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: CAS-
ES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 4 (2nd ed. 2009). 
 7. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 8. Id. at 496.  
 9. A general freight traffic manager and an assistant manager were found to 
have acted to benefit the corporation in violating the Elkins Act. Id. at 492–93. 
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an agent of a corporation could be held criminally liable under the 
respondeat superior theory of liability for performing acts within the 
scope of employment.10  As the Supreme Court stated, “many offens-
es might go unpunished and acts [can] be committed in violation of 
the law” without the respondeat superior theory of liability.11  The 
N.Y. Central decision is seen as the seminal statement allowing for di-
rect criminal sanctions for corporate wrongdoing.  The case resulted 
in a changed focus among prosecutors who began to look to corpo-
rate wrongdoing with new eyes.12  In the years since the N.Y. Central 
case, the courts have extended corporate criminal liability to include 
the Model Penal Code’s “high managerial agent,”13 a more restrictive 
view of corporate criminal liability.  Under this view of criminal liabil-
ity, the prosecution must identify at least one person within the cor-
poration with some level of managerial responsibility who condoned 
or participated in the criminal activity.14 
A much broader theory of criminal liability for corporations 
emerged in the mid-1980s known as the “collective knowledge” doc-
trine.15  This version of criminal liability holds that the corporation 
can be held accountable based on the collective knowledge of the sum 
of its individual corporate agents.  This theory is the broadest version 
of corporate liability because it does not require high level employees 
to sanction the wrongdoing.16  It emerged in 1987 in United States v. 
Bank of New England,17 after the Bank of New England (Bank) 
failed to file the Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) triggered by 
thirty-one separate cash withdrawals made by a customer over the 
 
 10. Id. at 499. 
 11. Id. at 495. 
 12. See generally Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees 
Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 53 (2007) (tracing the development of the broad rule of vicarious corporate 
liability and outlining features of prosecutorial guidelines). 
 13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1981).  The Model Penal Code limits criminal 
liability to only those who serve as a “high managerial agent” when committing the 
offense on behalf of the corporation. Id.  This more restricted view requires proof 
that someone with managerial responsibilities condone the actions for the corpora-
tion to be held liable. Id. 
 14. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (1)(c) (1981). 
 15. Id.  Under the collective knowledge doctrine, a corporation could be held ac-
countable based on the “sum of the knowledge of all of the employees.” United 
States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 16. Cf. Sarah Kelly Kilgore & Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability, 48 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 421, 431 (2011) (“[A] corporation may be liable even if there is no 
single employee at fault.”)  
 17. 821 F.2d 844 (1987). 
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course of a year’s time.18  Bank of New England increased the expo-
sure of financial institutions to include criminal actions for failure to 
file the required CTRs.  In adopting the collective knowledge theory 
of mens rea, the court acknowledged that no specific individual within 
the Bank knowingly violated the law.19  The court found that the col-
lective knowledge of all of the employees was sufficient to hold the 
Bank accountable for the failure to file the reports.20 
Most courts have rejected this theory of criminal liability, finding it 
overly broad and inconsistent with principles of criminal accountabil-
ity.21  Collective knowledge, however, is quite similar to the concept 
of “willful blindness,” which is used with regularity in drug prosecu-
tions.22  When an actor is willfully blind about a fact, and refuses to 
 
 18. The government charged the Bank with violations of 31 U.S.C. § 5322 for 
“willfully” failing to file the required forms for cash deposits. Id. at 846–47.  This col-
lective knowledge doctrine is beneficial in situations where it is difficult to establish 
willfulness to an artificial entity such as a corporation.  Because each of the Bank’s 
employees possessed at least one component of the required knowledge, the court 
accumulated this individual knowledge and held that it equated to collective 
knowledge of the Bank.  The court stated, 
Regarding the Bank’s specific intent to violate the reporting obligation, [the 
teller] testified that head teller knew that [the customer’s] transactions were 
reportable, but, on one occasion deliberately chose not to file a CTR on him 
because he was a “good customer.”  In addition, the jury heard testimony 
that bank employees regarded [the customer’s] transactions as unusual, 
speculated that he was a bookie, and suspected that he was structuring his 
transactions to avoid the Act’s reporting requirements.  An internal Bank 
memo, written after an investigation of the [customer’s] transactions, con-
cluded that a “person managing the branch would have to have known that 
something strange was going on.” Given the suspicions aroused…and the 
abundance of information indicating that his transactions were reportable, 
the jury could have concluded that the failure by Bank personnel to, at least, 
inquire about the reportability . . . constituted flagrant indifference to the 
obligations imposed by the Act.  
Id. at 857. 
 19. Id. at 856.  
 20. The Bank processed cash transactions over a twelve-month period of time ex-
ceeding $100,000. Id. at 852.  The case increased attention and exposure to banks 
which were circumventing the cash reporting requirements in place at that time.  The 
CTRs law was part of a series of statutes enacted in 1980 as part of the Bank Secrecy 
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 (2011), designed to allow the government to track the flow of 
large sums of cash in the economy and to criminalize the flow of illegally-generated 
funds.  Eventually, the reporting requirements lead to the enactment of the money 
laundering statutes which targeted the illegally derived funds directly rather than just 
a bank reporting requirement.  In 1986 Congress enacted the principal money laun-
dering statutes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (2011). 
 21. See, e.g., Kilgore & Smith, supra note 16, at 432. 
 22. Willful blindness has also been called the ostrich approach because it allows 
criminal prosecution of drug couriers who take possession of a package from a well-
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gain the requisite knowledge, the law will treat this as actual 
knowledge.23  Where a drug courier accepts a package under suspi-
cious circumstances, such as huge payment, directive not to open, or 
direction to deliver to only certain individuals at a particular time, this 
would raise suspicions in a reasonable person that criminal activity is 
afoot.  Willful blindness is also used in cases involving receipt and sale 
of stolen property—if it sounds too good to be true, and costs a frac-
tion of the retail value, it is in all likelihood stolen property.24  There 
is little reason not to utilize this theory of investigation and prosecu-
tion for mortgage and related frauds committed within and on behalf 
of financial institutions.  If a banker or executive can direct employ-
ees and agents to act in suspicious ways, tells them to just “do it” and 
not ask questions, or instructs them to destroy documents, then the 
supervisor is causing them to act in a willfully blind manner which is 
conduct suggestive of criminal knowledge.  Imputing the knowledge 
as collective knowledge, just as is done in the drug cases, is a viable 
theory of prosecution.  In fact, this is precisely how the court convict-
ed Bank of New England—the sum of all of the employees was im-
puted to the Bank.25  A comparable approach would assist in closing 
the schism between the two worlds of crime—street crime and white 
collar crime. 
II.  ECONOMIC DISPARITIES ARE REFLECTED IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE POLICIES 
Economic disparity in the United States has a direct impact on the 
nature of crime and the identity of individuals who are prosecuted 
 
known drug source without actual knowledge of the package contents. See, e.g., 
United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 77 n.4 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Alston-
Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  In these situations, the possessor does not 
have actual knowledge of the contents, but declines to inquire further.  Instead, the 
courier receives a huge fee for transporting the package.  Just as the ostrich buries its 
head in the sand to avoid observations, willful blindness in criminal prosecutions is 
consistent with the Model Penal Code’s description of criminal knowledge: “Re-
quirement of Knowledge Satisfied by Knowledge of High Probability.  When 
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such 
knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, un-
less he actually believes that it does not exist.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1962). 
 23. See Kilgore & Smith, supra note 16, at 431 (“Under this doctrine, proof of ei-
ther actual knowledge or conscious avoidance satisfies the knowledge require-
ment.”). 
 24. See, e.g., United States v. Coviello, 225 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2000) (prosecuting 
defendants for selling stolen Microsoft Windows as CD-ROMS for $15 each even 
though wholesale value was $165). 
 25. See United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1987).  
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and convicted for criminal conduct. One author described the situa-
tion succinctly in a comprehensive book titled, “The Rich Get Richer 
and the Poor Get Prison.”26  As I write this Article, we are witnessing 
the growth of Occupy Wall Street, a grassroots movement that started 
on Wall Street and spread across the globe.  The Occupiers consist of 
masses of individuals who are expressing their anger and frustration 
with the policies of the fiscally elite, the richest 1% of the popula-
tion.27  The movement began on September 17, 2011, and partially re-
flects a criticism of the Wall Street banking bailout that contributed 
to the collapsing economy and the current Great Recession.28  The 
Occupiers describe the movement as a “leaderless resistance move-
ment with people of many colors, genders and political persua-
sions.”29  According to the members of the movement, the one issue 
they all have in common is that they represent the 99% that will no 
longer tolerate the negative consequences caused by the greed and 
corruption of the 1%.30 
Contrasting the wealth of the 1% with the wealth of the 99%, 
working class people are protesting, in part, because their employ-
ment prospects are dwindling,31 while policies in place are leading to 
the accumulation of more and more wealth for the super rich.  A 
study recently released by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
reveals that the rich do indeed get even richer.32  This CBO study re-
vealed that the perceptions of the Occupiers are true.  CBO finds 
that, between 1979 and 2007, income grew by 275% for the top 1% of 
households, 65% for the next 19%, under 40% for the next 60%, and 
 
 26. REIMAN, supra note 3; see also DYLAN RATIGAN, GREEDY BASTARDS: HOW 
WE CAN STOP CORPORATE COMMUNISTS, BANKSTERS, AND OTHER VAMPIRES FROM 
SUCKING AMERICA DRY (2012) (describing how the author, an economic analyst for 
Bloomberg and CNBC, was outraged at the government’s handling of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis.  The author reviews the intersection between government and business re-
vealing the adverse impact on things financial, including banking policies, health care, 
student loans, and energy policies). 
 27. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 1. 
 28. See generally Farber, supra note 2 (discussing the Great Recession). 
 29. OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 1. 
 30. See id. 
 31. As of January 6, 2012, there are 13.1 million unemployed people in the United 
States. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE EMPLOYMENT 
SITUATION—JANUARY 2012 2 (2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit. 
pdf. 
 32. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBU-
TION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007 ix (2011), http://www.cbo. 
gov/ftpdocs/124xx/doc12485/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf. 
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18% for the bottom 20%.33  These huge variations in accumulated 
wealth, partly as a result of the greed on Wall Street, have moved 
many to call for the investigation and prosecution of those connected 
with the bank bailouts34 and the mortgage crisis.35 
Investigation and prosecution of both individuals and corporations 
bring on different and difficult challenges.36  Both individual and or-
ganized/corporate criminals are committing white collar offenses for 
personal financial gain.  Often, they are part of larger, organized 
groups, suggesting organizational criminal activity.37  This category of 
crimes includes offenses not commonly viewed as white collar offens-
es, such as the illegal distribution of drugs, which is also committed 
for financial gain.  With illegal drug distribution comes money laun-
dering and tax evasion, both characterized as white collar offenses.  
The harms, however, that come from fraud and its related offenses 
are vaster and more insidious than some of the traditional street of-
fenses, both in victim impact and losses.  The criminal justice system’s 
slow treatment of the mortgage fraud which triggered the current 
economic recession is a perfect example of disparate treatment of 
criminals and victims.  To date, few prosecutions of defendants have 
begun.  Some may say that the delayed response is because the con-
duct is not criminal. 
The major accounting firm Arthur Andersen was prosecuted for 
obstruction of justice for its role in destroying documents related to 
its accounting work for Enron Corporation in June 2002.  The indict-
 
 33. Id.  
 34. Bank bailouts were handled under the Troubled Asset Recovery Program 
(TARP).  Officials estimate the cost to taxpayers for the bank bailout at $25 billion. 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT 9 (2011), http:// 
cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110401232213/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/
cop-031611-report.pdf. 
 35. The details are more complex regarding the extent to which TARP has been 
successful. See Steve Adamske, TARP: By the Numbers, TREASURY NOTES BLOG 
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/TARP-by-the-numbers. 
aspx. 
 36. For example, all crimes must have evidence of the criminal mind. See, e.g., 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).  Locating the criminal mind, or mens 
rea, within a corporation, presents investigative challenges unlike those present with 
street crimes.  Nonetheless, these types of corporate offenses are successfully prose-
cuted.  
 37. Organized crimes, such as conspiracy and money laundering, have a much 
wider and more devastating impact on victims.  Money laundering is certainly at the 
heart of many drug distribution networks, but such motivation is also at the heart of 
many types of mortgage fraud.  In fact, using the banking and financial institutions to 
assist in the perpetration of the frauds makes this type of “insider” criminal activity 
more easily accomplished.  
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ment charged that the employer knowingly, intentionally, and cor-
ruptly encouraged its employees to shred documents related to En-
ron, then under investigation.38  As the case progressed through civil 
enforcement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
and criminal sentencing and fines, approximately 28,000 people lost 
their jobs, many more lost their retirement and Andersen went out of 
business.  In the end, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction based on an erroneous jury instruction on criminal intent with-
in a corporation.39 
Since the Andersen case, the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
began to back away from its aggressive pursuit of criminal sanctions 
for wide-ranging corporate wrongdoing.40  Instead, prosecutors re-
verted back to the civil justice system in an attempt to secure mone-
tary fines for what many called criminal conduct.41  The reduced bur-
den of proof and the ability of the government to extract huge 
concessions from a corporation made the civil route much easier for 
the government.42  Individuals who operate within corporations and 
 
 38. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005). 
 39. Id. at 698.  
 40. See generally Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons 
of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (2006).  In 2008, new 
Department of Justice guidelines allowed the government to take a softer approach 
to investigating and prosecuting corporate crimes.  Deferred prosecution agreements 
allow corporations to avoid prosecution if they agree to investigate and report their 
own wrongdoing.  This approach essentially outsources what should be a governmen-
tal investigation to the very corporation under scrutiny. See generally Memorandum 
from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen. on Selection and Use of Moni-
tors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with 
Corporations to Heads of Dep’t, U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.justice. 
gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf.  
 41. Gerald E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Miscon-
duct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 31 (1997) (arguing that “[c]orporate miscon-
duct appears to be a particularly suitable area for the application of punitive civil 
sanctions for three reasons: monetary sanctions are appropriate, corporate plaintiffs 
are relatively abundant, and specialized agencies exist to facilitate public enforce-
ment where that is necessary.”).  
 42. See Kurt Eichenwald, Analysis: Reversal of Andersen Conviction, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/business/01assess.html.  Many ob-
servers have applauded the reversal of the Andersen conviction stemming from the 
Enron case because of the huge collateral costs of the conviction.  The accounting 
firm Arthur Andersen imploded in the midst of the investigation and prosecution.  
Thousands of employees lost their jobs and retirements. Mary Flood, Supreme Court 
Overturns Arthur Andersen’s Enron Conviction, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (June 1, 
2005, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Supreme-Court-over 
turns-Arthur-Andersen-s-Enron-1952976.php.  The legal standard of criminal culpa-
bility, mens rea, and the question of whether a crime was even committed was at the 
forefront of the Supreme Court’s reversal. Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 704–08. 
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other organized entities should be aggressively prosecuted for mas-
sive frauds.  Others may say that the actions should be addressed 
through civil remedies.43  Regardless, the response has been slow.44  
Our definitions of crime tend to exclude a wide variety of conduct 
that is just as injurious and destructive, if not more so, than traditional 
offenses.  The next Part explores this topic. 
III.  LANGUAGE DOES MATTER 
Depictions of the Occupy Wall Street movement on the front pages 
and in the electronic and social media show the moral and emotional 
outrage suffered by victims of the recent financial collapse.  The 99% 
of main street protesting are indeed victims in a variety of ways; many 
have lost employment, housing, retirement, equity, and/or invest-
 
White-collar cases are not akin to—and are, in fact, often the opposite of—
trials involving murder or bank robbery, where everyone usually acknowl-
edges that a crime took place and merely debate the culpability of a particu-
lar defendant. Instead, in white-collar cases, defense lawyers often admit 
their client’s involvement in particular acts, while arguing that no crime ever 
occurred.”  
Eichenwald, supra. 
 43. Recently, the DOJ announced that it had reached a $25 billion settlement 
agreement with the five largest mortgage loan and servicing agencies.  Under the 
terms of the agreement, homeowners adversely affected by the mortgage crisis who 
are underwater on their loans might be able to seek loan modification to more accu-
rately reflect the home’s true value.  Successful loan modification will allow home-
owners to remain in their homes and continue to pay their mortgage and property 
taxes, thus continuing to the stabilization of the community. Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Bil-
lion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan 
Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ 
February/12-ag-186.html  
 44. On September 15, 2011, the DOJ issued an indictment against former United 
Commercial Bank (UCB) senior officers Ebrahim Shabudin and Thomas Yu in the 
Northern District of California.  Both individuals have been engaged in a $10 billion 
fraud at UCB in San Francisco, which specialized in lending to Chinese-Americans.  
The indictment was unsealed on October 11, 2011. See U.S. Attorney’s Office, For-
mer United Commercial Bank Officials Charged with Securities Fraud, FBI (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://www.fbi.gov/sanfrancisco/press-releases/2011/former-united-commercial 
-bank-officials-charged-with-securities-fraud.  A criminal information was also filed 
against former UCB senior officer Lauren Tran on May 24, 2011 and unsealed on Oc-
tober 13, 2011.  Tran pled guilty on June 15, 2011. See The UCB Indictment, WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Oct. 22, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/white 
collarcrime_blog/2011/10/the-ubc-indictments.html.  While it is true that some inves-
tigations of the banking crisis are ongoing and others are underway, the approach 
contrasts sharply with the investigative approach taken during the Savings and Loan 
crisis of the mid-1980s. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
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ments.  Many are “upside down” or underwater in their mortgage.45  
Language and terminology does make a difference.  When some peo-
ple discuss white collar and corporate crime, they tend to disconnect 
this category of criminal activity from main street crime.46  “Tradi-
tional” or “conventional” crimes usually have some level of interper-
sonal or sexual violence.  People rightly fear the very real harm that 
such crime inflicts on its victims.  Victims of traditional crimes have 
some level of proximity between criminal and victim so there is no 
doubt that a crime has been committed.  Individual losses in tradi-
tional crimes range from financial loss to bodily harm, with rape and 
homicide being some of the most serious offenses on the books. 
By contrast, corporate and white collar crimes are often shrouded 
in some level of moral ambiguity.  Who are the victims?  Do they 
know they are victimized?  Who can be held accountable?  Are there 
sufficient resources to address the harm?  Is it really even “fraud”?  
Will the government do anything to assist in recovering the loss?  
These are just some of the questions that arise in white collar and 
corporate crime, but rarely surface with traditional crimes.47 
The discourse in addressing crimes should stay focused on the 
committed acts, not the status of the actors.48  When we stay attentive 
to the definition of crime, we can maintain perspective on why some 
white collar criminals should be viewed as real criminals.  Indirect 
harms committed within and sanctioned by a corporation are no less 
criminal because of the status of the actors.  By focusing on the ac-
tions, rather than the actors, we can maintain a consistent and fairer 
 
 45. An “underwater mortgage” is a one that is higher than the value of the prop-
erty.  This negative equity imbalance often leads to financial ruin for the homeowner 
and foreclosure on the property.  The actual number of homes that are underwater is 
a moving target, as more and more homeowners lose their jobs, or suffer as their 
communities turn over with more vacancies.  Estimates suggest that one-fourth of all 
homeowners are underwater, owing more on their homes than their value. See Rex 
Nutting, 11.3 Million Homeowners Under Water on Mortgage, MARKETWATCH 
(Feb. 23, 2010, 6:21 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/113-million-homeown 
ers-underwater-on-mortgage-2010-02-23.  One local group in Boston, after occupying 
on Wall Street for thirteen days, organized a group of outraged homeowners, now in 
foreclosure, to sit-in and “occupy” Bank of America. See TAKE BACK BOSTON, 
http://takebackboston.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 
 46. See, e.g., Frank S. Perri, White-Collar Criminals: The ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Of-
fender?, 8 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. OFFENDER PROFILING 217, 217–41 (2011), 
http://www.all-about-forensic-psychology.com/support-files/white-collar-criminals. 
pdf. 
 47. See generally Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal 
Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501 (2004). 
 48. See REIMAN, supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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approach to criminality. 49 Organizations that inflict serious harms 
with the requisite mental state are criminal actors, not merely corpo-
rate actors committing “violations.”50 
Because the criminals often come from the privileged class, the sys-
tem of justice views appropriate punishment through the same elite 
language filter.51  White collar defendants are more likely to avoid 
prison through the payment of fines, restitution, community service, 
civil actions, and house arrest.52  There is a tendency not to categorize 
these criminals as real criminals because they are more than likely 
members of the business and professional community.  This skewed 
view of their status as criminals often stems from the close alignment 
between white collar criminals and those who investigate, prosecute, 
and punish them.  After all, many white collar and corporate crimi-
nals are often members of the same elite class as are legislators, judg-
es, and prosecutors.53  Edwin H. Sutherland first defined white collar 
crime as a “crime committed by a person of respectability and high 
social status in the course of his occupation.”54  He later elaborated: 
First, the methods used in the enforcement of any law are an adap-
tion to the characteristics of the prospective violators of the law, as 
appraised by the legislators and the judicial and administrative per-
sonnel.  The appraisals regarding business men, who are the pro-
spective violators of the [law] include a combination of fear and ad-
miration.  Those who are responsible for the system of criminal 
justice are afraid to antagonize business men; among other conse-
 
 49. A fundamental element of a crime is the actus reus, which is defined as “[t]he 
guilty act.  A wrongful deed which renders the actor criminally liable if combined 
with mens rea.  The actus reus is the physical aspect of a crime, whereas the mens rea 
(guilty mind) involves the intent factor.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (Centennial 
ed. 1991).  The criminal is “one who has committed a criminal offense; one who has 
been legally convicted of a crime; one adjudged guilty of crime.” Id. at 372. 
 50. A violation is a classification used by the Model Penal Code for public welfare 
offenses, and is not defined as a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (1981).  Viola-
tions are, historically, committed by corporations and organizations and punishment 
is usually just a monetary fine. See Ezra Ross, The Collection Gap: 
Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV.  453, 455 (2011) (“[I]n the corporate context, [] financial penalties are of-
ten the primary means of redressing both civil and criminal offenses . . . .”). 
 51. See Edwin A. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 8 
(1940).  
 52. Cf. id. 
 53. See Edwin H. Sutherland, Is “White Collar Crime” Crime?, 10 AM. SOC. REV. 
132, 137 (1945) [hereinafter Sutherland, “White Collar Crime”] (describing “the cul-
tural homogeneity of legislators, judges, and administrators with business men.”). 
 54. Edwin H. Sutherland, President, American Sociological Society Presidential 
Address: White-Collar Criminality (Dec. 1939). 
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quences, such antagonism may result in a reduction in contributions 
to the campaign funds needed to win the next election.  Probably 
much more important is the cultural homogeneity of legislators, 
judges, and administrators with business men.  Legislators admire 
and respect business men and cannot conceive of them as criminals, 
that is, business men do not conform to the popular stereotypes of 
“the criminal.”  The legislators are confident that these business men 
will conform as a result of very mild pressures.55 
Although Sutherland first defined “white collar crime” in a 1939 
speech, the vestiges of these misperceptions still hold true today.  As 
of this writing, the criminals responsible for the Great Recession have 
enjoyed relative immunity.56 
Two comparisons can be made: the governmental response to the 
Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis, and the governmental response to 
drug investigations and prosecutions. By comparison, the financial 
losses of victims of corporate and white collar crimes far exceed the 
losses of traditional street crimes.57  A bank robber might succeed in 
 
 55. Sutherland, “White Collar Crime,” supra note 53. 
 56. Harvey Silvergate, Justice ‘Deferred’, FORBES (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2011/07/14/justice-deferred/ (discussing 
the proliferation of deferred prosecution in large-scale financial cases). 
 57. It is difficult to get an exact measure on the actual losses occasioned by white 
collar and corporate crime.  Partly, the difficulty lies with the vast types of white col-
lar crimes by definition.  According to FBI reports, white collar crime includes frauds 
such as financial, corporate, securities, health, mortgage, insurance, marketing, and 
money laundering, among others. See 2009 Financial Crimes Report, FBI (2009) 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009.  The FBI 
reports statistics in areas of white collar and corporate crimes.  Part of the challenge 
in obtaining accurate victim impact statements is the way in which the numbers are 
reported.  The FBI breaks down the stats to include restitution, recoveries, fines and 
seizures as well as matters under investigation. See Financial Crimes Report to the 
Public Fiscal Year 2006, FBI (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fcs 
_report2006/financial-crimes-report-to-the-public-fiscal-year-2006.  The most recent 
report details the following in each category.   
Corporate Crimes:  
During FY 2006, the FBI investigated 490 Corporate Fraud cases resulting 
in 171 indictments and 124 convictions of corporate criminals. Numerous 
cases are pending plea agreements and trials.  The following notable statisti-
cal accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for Corporate Fraud: $1.2 bil-
lion in Restitutions, $41.5 million in Recoveries, $14.2 million in Fines, and 
$62.6 million in Seizures. 
Id. at 6.   
Securities Fraud:  
During FY 2006, the FBI investigated 1165 cases of Securities and Com-
modities fraud and recorded 302 indictments and 164 convictions.  Many of 
these Securities Fraud cases are pending plea agreements or trials.  The fol-
lowing notable statistical accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for Se-
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obtaining a few thousand dollars with the threat of violence on a de-
 
curities and Commodities Fraud: $1.9 billion in Restitutions, $20.6 million in 
Recoveries, $80.7 million in Fines, and $62.7 million in Seizures. 
Id. at 12.   
Health Care Fraud:  
Through FY 2006, 2,423 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 588 in-
dictments and 534 convictions of Health Care Fraud criminals.  Numerous 
cases are pending plea agreements and trials.  The following notable statisti-
cal accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for Health Care Fraud: $373 
million in Restitutions, $1.6 billion in Recoveries, $172.9 million in Fines, 
and $24.3 million in Seizures.”  
Id. at 17.  
Mortgage Fraud:  
Through FY 2006, 818 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 263 indict-
ments and 204 convictions of Mortgage Fraud criminals.  The following no-
table statistical accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for Mortgage 
Fraud: $388.9 million in Restitutions, $1.4 million in Recoveries, and $231 
million in Fines. 
Id. at 26. 
Identity Theft:  
Through FY 2006, 1255 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 457 in-
dictments and 405 convictions of Identity Theft criminals.  The following 
notable statistical accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for Identity 
Theft Fraud across all FBI Programs: $156.5 million in Restitutions, $4.3 
million in Recoveries, and $1.2 million in Fines. 
Id. at 32.   
Insurance Fraud:  
During FY 2006, 233 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 53 indict-
ments and 54 convictions of Insurance Fraud criminals.  The number of cas-
es and subsequent arrest and conviction statistics will likely rise in the near 
future as more fraud is uncovered in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  The 
following notable statistical accomplishments are reflective in FY 2006 for 
Insurance Fraud: $30 million in Restitutions and $3 million in Seizures. 
Id. at 37.   
Mass Marketing Fraud:  
Through FY 2006, 147 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 13 indict-
ments and 44 convictions of Mass Marketing Fraud criminals.  The FBI’s in-
volvement in multi-agency initiatives like Global Con has helped make sig-
nificant strides in combating this fraud, as reflected in the FBI’s notable 
statistical accomplishments as follows: $268.8 million in Restitutions, $86.9 
million in Fines and $12.4 million in Seizures. 
Id. at 41.   
Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering:  
Through FY 2006, 473 cases investigated by the FBI resulted in 161 indict-
ments and 95 convictions of Money Laundering Fraud criminals. For FY 
2006, the following Money Laundering most notable accomplishments were 
achieved for the White Collar Crime Program: $17 million in Restitutions 
and $3.3 million in Recoveries. FBI Financial Crimes Report to the Public 
Fiscal Year 2006, October 31, 2005–September 30, 2001. 
Id. at 45. 
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mand note handed to a bank teller.  The bank embezzler, on the oth-
er hand, will often get away with millions of dollars with the click of a 
button at her office computer.58  The criminal act in the embezzle-
ment scenario might not be uncovered for some time after the crimi-
nal act. 
We need to adjust our discourse and call the criminal activity on 
Wall Street what it is: real crime that impacts Main Street.  Instead of 
muting the moral outcry with nebulous terms such as “violations,” 
“workplace accidents,” and “defrauding,” we should be more precise 
in describing the “environmental accident” as criminal negligence or 
even negligent homicide, and those who are defrauded as victims of 
“robbery” whose assets were “stolen.”  As with all crimes, we should 
focus on the acts, not the description of the actor.59  Crimes are de-
fined by the actus reus and the mens rea, not the income level or sta-
tus of the offender.60  When we liberate white collar crime from these 
terminology shackles, we uncover the reality: real crime by real crim-
inals causing real harm.  If the 1% really lived on Main Street, they 
would comprehend the perspective of the 99% who are occupying 
Wall Street.  One thing that the Occupy Wall Street movement has 
done is to bring to the forefront the personal moral outcry of the 
99%, including the disparate treatment of criminals. 
If we examine criminality viewed through the lens of victims, it is 
much easier to reconcile similarities between street crimes, such as 
drug dealing, and white collar crimes, such as mortgage frauds.  The 
next Part highlights some of the similarities between mortgage fraud 
and drug dealing. 
IV.  MORTGAGE FRAUD 
The term “mortgage fraud” can mean a variety of things.  The FBI 
has defined it as either fraud for profit or fraud for housing.61  Mort-
 
 58. The robber, convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 is likely to be sentenced to 
twenty to twenty-five years. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
Manual, § 2B3.1 (Nov. 2011).  The bank employee who embezzles from within the 
same bank, and is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 656 might get five years or so of prison 
time. Id. § 2B1.1. 
 59. “Actus reus” means the guilty act.  It is a “wrongful deed which renders the 
actor criminally liable if combined with mens rea.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 49, at 36. 
 60. Crime is defined as “a positive or negative act in violation of penal law.” Id. at 
370 (emphasis added). 
 61. Assistant Secretary of the criminal division of the FBI testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and offered the FBI’s definition of mortgage fraud:  
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gage fraud is a real crime, and I submit it has more similarities to 
street crime than our compartmentalized notion of white collar crime 
permits.  As long as we view mortgage fraud and its related types of 
financial fraud as white collar and corporate crime, we minimize our 
approach to dealing with the real harm to people.  This is one of the 
rallying cries of the Occupy Wall Street movement: big banks and fi-
nancial institutions operate in their own self-interest with impunity, 
and the masses be damned.  The fear is that as the rich continue to 
grow richer and the income disparity in this country widens, inaction 
or preferential approaches by law enforcement and the federal gov-
ernment to mortgage fraudsters will only exacerbate the inequities. 
The current mortgage crisis, connected with the banking bailout 
and economic collapse of financial institutions during the summer of 
2008 and continuing to this day, has had a devastating effect on com-
munities as well as individuals.  After the bailout,62 Congress thought 
that the banks would act to turn around the economy by reinvigorat-
ing mortgage loans to help to stabilize the housing industry.63  In fact, 
although the banks received billions of federal dollars for their 
 
The FBI delineates mortgage fraud in two distinct areas: 1) Fraud for Profit; 
and 2) Fraud for Housing. Fraud for Profit uses a scheme to remove equity, 
falsely inflate the value of the property or issue loans relating to fictitious 
property(ies). Many of the Fraud for Profit schemes rely on “industry insid-
ers”, who override lender controls. The FBI defines industry insiders as ap-
praisers, accountants, attorneys, real estate brokers, mortgage underwriters 
and processors, settlement/title company employees, mortgage brokers, 
loan originators, and other mortgage professionals engaged in the mortgage 
industry. 
Fraud for Housing represents illegal actions perpetrated by a borrower, typ-
ically with the assistance of real estate professionals. The simple motive be-
hind this fraud is to acquire and maintain ownership of a house under false 
pretenses. This type of fraud is typified by a borrower who makes misrepre-
sentations regarding the borrower’s income or employment history to quali-
fy for a loan. 
The Need for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 102, 102 (2009) (state-
ment of John S. Pistole, Deputy Director, FBI) [hereinafter Statement of John S. 
Pistole].  
 62. The bailout of financial institutions began in the summer of 2008 and contin-
ued through 2009.  The figures reveal the following amounts of the bailout: Bear 
Sterns ($30 billion 2008); Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ($200 billion 2008); American 
International Group ($180 billion 2008); Auto Industry ($25 billion); Troubled Asset 
Relief Program ($700 billion 2008); Citigroup ($280 billion); Bank of America 
($142.2 billion 2009). History of U.S. Government Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 
2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.propublica.org/special/government-bailouts. 
 63. Sharyl Attkisson, Where Did The Bailout Billions Really Go?, CBS NEWS 
(May 26, 2009, 5:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/12/eveningnews/ 
main4717298.shtml. 
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bailout,64 not much benefit has inured to the individual homeown-
ers.65  As a result, individuals have lost their homes during this eco-
nomic downturn, triggering a foreclosure crisis not seen since the 
great depression. Industry observers, such as Housing Predictor, fore-
casted the coming crisis five years ago and project that we have only 
seen the tip of the iceberg.66  “An estimated 7.6 million residential 
properties have been foreclosed since the crisis started, with another 
7.4 million foreclosures forecast through 2016.”67  Vacancies were ini-
tially concentrated in particular neighborhoods and states,68 triggering 
increased criminal activity in those areas.  Moreover, these vacancies 
further depress housing costs across the board, resulting in decreasing 
tax bases.  These tax losses have a ripple effect on schools and busi-
nesses in the affected communities. 
In the midst of this crisis, many banks and other financial institu-
tions have benefitted from the collapse of the market, mainly through 
the receipt of taxpayer bailout money.69  Many have maintained that 
this is not an issue of criminality at all, and suggest that the crisis 
should be handled as a civil matter; they call for the foreclosure crises 
to “run its course”70 and play out with further vacancies, allowing in-
vestors to sweep in and buy cheap housing to bolster the investor’s 
profits.  Others blame the Occupiers for their own predicament and 
say they should just get a job.71  People who hold this view fail to 
 
 64. History of U.S. Government Bailouts, supra note 62. 
 65. See Attkisson, supra note 63. 
 66. See HOUSINGPREDICTOR, www.housingpredictor.com (last visited Mar. 30, 
2012). 
 67. Kevin Chu, Foreclosures Forecast to Hit 15 Million Homeowners, 
HOUSINGPREDICTOR (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.housingpredictor.com/2011/foreclos 
ures-crisis-forecast.html. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Banks earned approximately $13 billion in income by taking advantage of be-
low-market rates. Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave 
Banks $13 Billion Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011, 7:10 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-
congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-income.html. 
 70. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney, when speaking to the Las Vegas Re-
view-Journal’s editorial board in October 2011, stated that after allowing the foreclo-
sure process to “hit bottom,’’ the government should “allow investors to buy up 
homes, put renters in them, fix the homes up, and let it turn around and come back 
up.” Jim Rutenberg, DNC Ad Goes After Romney in Arizona, CAUCUS BLOG—
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011, 5:59 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/10/24/dnc-ad-goes-after-romney-in-arizona/?scp=1&sq=romney%20foreclosures 
%20run&st=cse. 
 71. Presidential candidate Herman Cain said that the protesters who do not have 
jobs have no one to blame but themselves: 
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acknowledge the human toll of this type of massive fraudulent activi-
ty.  Of course, the government has at its disposal the full panoply of 
civil remedies available to address the wrongdoing, including fines, 
restitution, and debarment.  This Article maintains that the conduct 
of the banks and financial institutions can legitimately be categorized 
as criminal and aggressively pursued as serious crimes. 
V.  COMPARISON TO THE SAVINGS AND LOAN CRISIS 
The approach taken today contrasts sharply with the government’s 
reaction to the S&L crisis in the 1980s.  When the S&L crisis was per-
colating in the 1980s, federal law enforcement quickly addressed the 
widespread fraud.72  The government formed a federal task force in 
Dallas, Texas, and the government committed massive resources to 
investigate and prosecute the actors and institutions involved in the 
fraud.73  The fraud at that time permeated the entire savings and loan 
industry and had ramifications beyond the immediate impact on indi-
vidual institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation.74  In the wake of the S&L crisis, strike forces were es-
tablished in twenty-seven cities, 1000 FBI investigators and agents 
were dispatched across the nation, accompanied by forensic account-
ants and many federal prosecutors.  This concerted effort resulted in 
 
I don’t have facts to back this up, but I happen to believe that these demon-
strations are planned and orchestrated to distract from the failed policies of 
the Obama administration. Don’t blame Wall Street, don’t blame the big 
banks, if you don’t have a job and you’re not rich, blame yourself! . . . It is 
not a person’s fault if they succeeded, it is a person’s fault if they failed.  
Paige Lavender, Herman Cain: Occupy Wall Street Protesters Should ‘Go Home and 
Get a Job and a Life’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/28/herman-cain-occupy-wall-street_n_10637 
03.html. 
 72. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States experienced a similar  
financial crisis with the collapse of the savings and loans. The Department 
of Justice (DOJ), and more specifically the FBI, were provided a number of 
tools through the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and Crime Control Act of 1990 (CCA) to 
combat the aforementioned crisis.  As stated in Senate Bill 331 dated Janu-
ary 27, 2009, “in the wake of the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s, a se-
ries of strike forces based in 27 cities was staffed with 1000 FBI agents and 
forensic experts and dozens of federal prosecutors. That effort yielded more 
than 600 convictions and $130,000,000 in ordered restitution.”  
Statement of John S. Pistole, supra note 61, at 102. 
 73. See The Dallas Division: A Brief History, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/ 
about-us/history/history. 
 74. See REIMAN, supra note 3, at 136. 
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$130 million in ordered restitution along with more than 600 convic-
tions of key actors.75 
Between the 1980s and today, the War on Drugs was in full swing 
and continues.76  The National Office of Drug Policy reports that the 
U.S. federal government spent over $15 billion dollars in 2010 on the 
War on Drugs, at a rate of about $500 per second.77  There has been 
no lack of aggressive pursuit of drug cartels and organizations.  This 
Article does not suggest that drug offenses are not serious crimes, or 
that they should not be prosecuted.  There are, however, an over-
whelming number of men of color sitting in prisons today for crack 
cocaine convictions, suffering under sentences that are harsher than 
the corresponding sentences imposed for cocaine convictions.78  The 
broader implication in the drug prosecutorial policies is that the gov-
ernment will focus its efforts on certain criminal conduct to the exclu-
sion of other wrongs.79  A properly funded War on Greed, with as 
much emphasis and resources as the War on Drugs, could possibly 
minimize or even prevent some of financial harms we are witnessing.  
If a fair comparison is made between the harms suffered by the mort-
gage fraud, for example, and the drug victims, one can make a sound 
argument that the financial fraudster inflicts more harm on the indi-
viduals and communities.  Again, a focus on the act rather than the 
status of the actor is revealing. 
The basic definition of a crime is the actus reus triggered by the 
criminal mens rea.80  The criminal mind must precede the actions by 
the corporation or individual and cause the harm.81  In every criminal 
case, prosecutors tackle these legal questions to satisfy the burden of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.82  In this Article, I argue that if it 
 
 75. See id. at 137–41. 
 76. The War on Drugs has had a huge impact on the criminal justice system, rang-
ing from investigations to sentencing.  A huge amount of government resources has 
gone into fighting this war on both the federal and state levels.  The Drug War Clock 
keeps real time of the financial impact of the War on Drugs. Drug War Clock, 
DRUGSENSE, http://www.drugsense.org/cms/wodclock. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Hearing on Retroactivity of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Amendments 
Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (written testimony of 
Jesselyn McCurdy, Senior Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union), 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20110601/Testimony_ACLU_Jesselyn_McCurdy.pdf. 
 79. See JEFFREY A. MIRON, A CRITQUE OF ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC COSTS OF 
DRUG ABUSE 17–18 (2003), http://www.dpfmass.org/pdf/miron_report.pdf. 
 80. 21 Am. Jur. 2D Criminal Law § 117 (2011). 
 81. See id.  
 82. 21A Am. Jur. 2D Criminal Law § 1198 (2011).  
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looks like a crime, smells like a crime, fits the definition of a crime, 
one should call it a crime and treat it as such.  Much of white collar 
criminal activity is no less deserving of criminal investigation and pun-
ishment than the “street crime” and, as such, should be pursued as 
aggressively.  To segregate white collar criminal offenses as deserving 
of civil penalties and deferred prosecution agreements maintains the 
notion that white collar crime is not really crime at all, but merely an 
offense, a violation, or mistaken accounting practices.  It is precisely 
this view of crimes of privilege that has placed us in a parallel uni-
verse concerning the treatment of criminal conduct by the affluent. 
VI.  VICTIMIZATION, MORTGAGE FRAUD, AND DRUG OFFENSES 
With respect to the mortgage crisis, the depth of victimization is so 
wide that its consequences are just being revealed and the potential 
ramifications are unknown at this point in time.83  Based on what we 
do know, the numbers are staggering.84  Some have projected that 
what we know is only the tip of the iceberg.85 
Victims of white collar and corporate crime suffer in extreme dis-
proportion to those who are victims of so-called street crimes.86  The 
financial losses are astronomical with devastating consequences for 
the victim, families, and communities.87  The crimes of the elite ex-
tract a much greater cost on individuals and society than those of the 
so-called street criminals. 
 
 83. FBI, MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW, 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010/mortgage-fraud-
2010 (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 84. In 2010, foreclosure filings have increased to 2.9 million homes. Record 2.9 
Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low 
in December, REALTYTRAC (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-
releases/record-29-million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-
30-month-low-in-december-6309. 
 85. Robbie Whelan, Mortgage Fraud is Rising, With a Twist, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 
23, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000142405274870382430457543538316143 
6658.html (“The real losses to banks won’t be known for several years when banks 
are forced to write off the value of the [loan].”).  As with most white collar crime, the 
criminals are quick to adapt to new laws and restrictions, often staying a step ahead 
of the government investigators. Id. (“Fraudsters have adapted to the new re-
strictions.  With banks less apt to lend to borrowers with shaky finances, criminals 
rely more on falsifying documents, recruiting loan officers and other bank insiders to 
work for them, and stealing identities to get loans, federal investigators and mortgage 
industry research reports.”). 
 86. See RODNEY HUFF, ET AL., NATIONAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CENTER., NA-
TIONAL PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2010). 
 87. See id.  
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The numbers are overwhelming in this current fiscal crisis.  The 
damage to individuals who have lost their homes through fraud is one 
thing, but the additional parallel damage exposes the true extent of 
the problem.  One example is the effect of the current financial crisis 
on some of the most vulnerable victims: children.  Not only does 
mortgage fraud and deceit affect the parents, but it has also contrib-
uted to the growing number of homeless youth.88  School administra-
tors are reporting more and more children who are moving from shel-
ters to park benches to cars because their families have lost their 
homes to foreclosure.89  Our nation’s children are at risk and the 
harm they are suffering is further evidence of the damages resulting 
from the financial meltdown.  These harms are comparable to the 
harms that children suffer when their parents are involved in drug ac-
tivities that directly impact their homes and communities.90 
Closer to “home,” neighborhoods suffer when foreclosures esca-
late.  There is a rippling effect because the impact of mortgage fraud 
is not limited to the individual mortgage criminals, but extends well 
beyond to adverse impacts on the community and region.  As our 
banking crisis clearly demonstrates, the country came to the brink of 
economic collapse, stemming mostly from banking and mortgage re-
lated activities.91  The prevalence of foreclosures and vacancies, once 
seen in more limited numbers in low-income neighborhoods, has 
moved to the suburbs.92  Even the McMansions are affected when a 
 
 88. Children suffer because of foreclosures.  When their families lose their hous-
ing, it impacts their education, emotional well-being, health, and safety. Dina 
Elboghdady, Foreclosure Takes Toll on Increasing Number of Children, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/21/ 
AR2010112104255.html. 
 89. The impact on children is reverberating through communities, schools, and 
institutions. See Linda Hall, Children of Foreclosure Falling Behind in School, CNN 
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-27/living/am.foreclosures.education_1 
_education-of-homeless-children-kids-at-greater-risk-move?_s=PM:LIVING. 
 90. The success or failure of the so-called War on Drugs is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  I draw comparisons to the harms suffered by victims of financial crimes, 
like mortgage fraud, to compare and contrast these harms with those suffered by vic-
tims of the War on Drugs. See generally NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE 
WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED (2005). 
 91. See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—
AND THEMSELVES (2009).  HBO also produced a documentary of the same name, 
describing the historic bailout of Wall Street and the ramifications of the financial 
crisis. TOO BIG TO FAIL (HBO Films 2011). 
 92. See A Suburb Once Set Apart Now Feeling the Foreclosure Crisis, CBS ST. 
LOUIS (Oct. 7, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/10/07/a-suburb-once-
set-apart-now-feeling-the-foreclosure-crisis. 
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vacancy attracts people intent on committing further crimes from the 
new home base.93  The cycle of fraud and danger is astounding when 
viewed through the lens of traditional crimes and from the victims’ 
perspectives.  In many ways, the fallout from fraudulent mortgages 
has similarities to the fallout from criminal drug activities.94 
Vacant housing is one example.  The oversupply of empty homes 
allows criminals to use the houses as fronts for further criminal activi-
ty.95  Homes that have been foreclosed due to the financial crisis are 
sitting empty in previously stable neighborhoods.  The vacant homes 
are prime targets for vandalization and destruction.96  Vacancies in a 
community present a prime opportunity for criminals to operate.  If 
the community is in an upscale area, the criminal conduct can go un-
detected because law enforcement might not be looking in that area 
or region.97  Criminal conduct in the suburbs can flourish in the ab-
sence of law enforcement scrutiny.  Financial crimes can operate be-
hind closed doors in the comfort of a quiet subdivision. 
Because of the vacancies, squatters can, and do, move in.98  Squat-
ters may cause destruction to the house, resulting in a fraudulent in-
 
 93. See generally Christopher B. Leinberger, The Next Slum?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 2008), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/the-next-slum/66 
53. 
 94. See OHIO PIRG, FORECLOSURES, FAILED BANKS AND FEES: WHY OHIO 
NEEDS A NEW CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY 6 (2009), http://www. 
ohiopirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Why-Ohio-Needs-a-New-Consumer-Financial-
Protection-Agency.pdf. 
 95. Any type of criminal activity can be conducted in the shadow of a “safe” 
neighborhood.  McMansions can be turned into fronts for money launderers and drug 
traffickers hiding in the suburbs.  Regardless of the relative affluence of the neigh-
borhood, these new residents will surely bring down the values of surrounding prop-
erties because the occupants have no vested interest in maintaining the value of the 
property.  Thus, surrounding homes are slowly devalued, which triggers other ad-
verse consequences. See Leinberger, supra note 93. 
 96. A vacant and unattended home is a prime target for thieves to strip the house 
of anything valuable, such as appliances, lighting, carpet, electrical wiring, doors, 
windows, heating and air conditioning systems, and copper piping. See Kat Zemen, 
How Your Home Insurance Can Vanish Overnight, INSURE.COM, http://www.insure. 
com/home-insurance/home-insurance-can-vanish.html (last updated Apr. 30, 2010) 
(stating that most home insurance companies will not cover a home that is vacant be-
cause the likelihood of vandalism increases). 
 97. It is well documented that police put most of their law enforcement efforts in-
to poor communities where they get a bigger “bang for their buck.”  As a result of 
law enforcement inattention, crime in the suburbs can flourish. See, e.g., Charles 
Thomas, South ‘burbs See More Crime as Chicago Rate Drops, ABC 7 NEWS (Oct. 3, 
2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8377123.  
 98. Jonathan Mummolo & Bill Brubaker, As Foreclosed Homes Empty, Crime 
Arrives, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2008/04/26/AR2008042601288.html. 
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surance claim processed by the individuals who secured the foreclo-
sure, often initially through fraudulent means.99  Squatters, who are 
not members of the community via purchase, can cause disruption for 
all, including children who may come into contact with the squat-
ters.100  The potential for abuse of children is prevalent, and demon-
strates a consequence of the mortgage fraud crisis that is not often 
discussed.  Squatter danger is similar to the presence of any other 
type of stranger without a legitimate right to be present in a neigh-
borhood, including drug dealers.  Vacancies and the occupants can 
pose a threat to children and other residents. 
If squatters are not in the homes, then the criminals might turn the 
houses into rentals, assisted-living facilities, or half-way houses.101  
This category of new residents is not necessarily involved or even 
knowledgeable about the initial fraudulent schemes, and perhaps en-
tirely innocent of any wrongdoing which may have caused the vacan-
cy.  The impact on the community is devastating nonetheless.  Rami-
fications of these “secret” occupants can result in further 
deterioration of the community through increased violence, as resi-
dents flee in fear of criminal activity.102  What once was a stable resi-
dential community can deteriorate quickly into a crime ridden region, 
through no fault of the original residents.  Just as a neighborhood can 
turn from a stable middle class community to one with a criminal drug 
 
 99. There is a squatters’ movement taking advantage of the huge number of va-
cant homes.  Empty homes are stripped of all valuable appliances, carpet, lighting, 
copper piping, and sit ready for a person in need of housing to move in.  These mod-
ern day squatters justify their actions because they see themselves as providing a 
needed and essential service: housing.  “Let the record reflect, there was no lock on 
the door . . . . I am not breaking in,” says Take Back the Land’s director, Max Ra-
meau of his Miami area squatters’ efforts on behalf of the homeless. John Leland, 
With Advocates’ Help, Squatters Call Foreclosures Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/us/10squatter.html.  
 100. See Neighbors Say Park Lane Home Disrupting Neighborhood, THE FORUM 
NEWSGROUP (Jan. 19, 2012), http://theforumnewsgroup.com/2012/01/19/neighbors-
say-park-lane-home-disrupting-neighborhood. 
 101. Some organizations have actively advocated for the reuse of empty houses as 
a way to address the housing crisis for the homeless.  For example, Women in Transi-
tion seeks housing for victims of domestic violence as a way to provide shelter to 
women fleeing domestic abuse situations. Jim the Realtor, Squatters on the Move, 
BUBBLEINFO (Apr. 10, 2009, 8:55 AM), http://www.bubbleinfo.com/2009/04/10/ 
squatters-on-the-move/.   
 102. When a house turns into a crystal meth lab or a marijuana farm, the addition 
of new “customers” present a new public nuisance to law-abiding residents. 
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organizational presence,103 similarly a community can lose its stability 
when mortgage fraud impacts its residents.  Describing one type of 
activity as “white collar” crime and the other as “ordinary” crime 
does not lessen the impact on the victimized residents. 
Financial impact is another category of harm.  When residents flee 
a neighborhood, the adverse consequences continue.  Millions of 
home owners are now faced with negative equity in their home,104 a 
fact that has huge consequences for the middle class and baby boom-
ers nearing retirement.  Housing prices are expected to continue to 
fall as a result of this economic downturn.105  Although the value of 
the homes has declined, many of the innocent homeowners continue 
to be taxed based on the tax assessment prior to the deflation of their 
home’s value.106  In this way, they are subsidizing the fraud.  Moreo-
ver, property values eventually will decline to reflect the newly ad-
justed reality as homes reset to true value in a post-recession world.  
When this occurs, the tax base suffers.107  County tax values decline, 
 
 103. The economic cost of drug abuse and trafficking is estimated at $215 billion. 
See Impact of Drugs on Society National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST. (Feb. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/drugImpact.htm. 
 104. CoreLogic indicates that 11.1 million, or 23.1%, of all residential properties 
with a mortgage were in negative equity (totaling $750 billion) at the end of the 
fourth quarter 2010, up from 10.8 million, or 22.5%, in the previous quarter. New 
CoreLogic Data Shows 23 Percent of Borrowers Underwater with $750 Billion Dol-
lars of Negative Equity, CORELOGIC (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.corelogic.com/ 
downloadable-docs/corelogic-q4-2010-negative-equity-report.pdf. 
 105. According to the National Association of Realtors, pending home sales de-
creased 6% from 2009 to 2010, and existing home sales decreased 5.7% for the same 




 106. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, Property Tax Assessment: 
Who Needs It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1042 (2006) (tax assessments in New 
York do not reflect the true value of a property for homeowners).  
 107. A decrease in property values actually results from an initially false inflation 
of property values.  As a fraudulent transaction might involve several inflated trans-
fers of property, each one raising the price, the property value has little relation to 
the true value of the property.  When the bubble bursts, the criminals walk away with 
thousands of dollars.  The original homeowner has lost the house, but the tax assessor 
has an inflated property on the books of the tax rolls.  In one widely publicized case, 
there is a documented increase in assessed value over the course of a eight year time 
period.  As the values increased, property tax assessments for other neighboring 
homeowners rose.  After the fraud was uncovered, residents were being overcharged 
on their property taxes to the tune of $10.36 million.  See Andrew T. Carswell, Ef-
fects of Mortgage Fraud on Property Tax Assessments, 6 J. PROP. TAX ASSESSMENT 
& ADMIN. 5, 5 (2009); Kevin Duffy, Study: Poor Neighborhoods Face Unfair Proper-
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which further impacts schools and neighborhood services dependent 
on tax revenue for sustainability.  The cycle continues as businesses in 
the community close because of decreased demand for goods and ser-
vices.108  The need for basic services, such as police and fire protec-
tion, continues, but with decreased revenue to support governmental 
obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
Mortgage schemes are committed by a variety of individuals as well 
as huge financial institutions.109  As a concept, we should decide 
whether to treat mortgage fraud as a type of white collar offense or 
more as a “street” offense.  Categorization is important for a variety 
of reasons.  White collar crime is seen in many circles as not as serious 
as common street offenses.110  As a result, the punishments are not as 
harsh, the need to investigate subsides, and the quest for justice di-
minishes.111 
With this current mortgage fraud crisis, I argue that we cannot con-
tinue to view the perpetrators as mere fraudsters with the resulting 
ramifications.112  Foreclosures, negative amortization, and govern-
ment inaction to address this conduct have all widened the disparity 
between the richest 1% and the other 99%.  Law enforcement should 
give this crisis the attention it deserves, just as they do with criminal 
drug activity.  After all, the harms are often parallel, the devastation 
on communities is analogous, and the prospect is even grimmer for 
the economy.  Rather, to a certain extent the mortgage fraud crisis 
has had some of the most wide-ranging impact on society, affecting 
the individuals directly impacted and many beyond.  In fact, this trick-
ling down effect is one of the motivations for the Occupy Wall Street 
movement, which has spread world-wide.  The Occupiers are discon-
 
ty Taxes, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.ajc.com/homefinder/content/ 
metro/stories/2008/10/09/property_tax_study.html. 
 108. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  A recent report highlighted the 
ways that the foreclosure crisis causes reduced tax bases, decreased revenue for local 
government services, and other financial harms to the impacted neighborhoods. See 
CHRISTINE VIDMAR, NEIGHBORHOOD WORKS AMERICA, SEVEN WAYS FORECLO-
SURES IMPACT COMMUNITIES, (2008), available at http://www.nw.org/network/neigh 
borworksprogs/foreclosuresolutions/reports/documents/7ForeclosureImpacts.pdf. 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 854–59 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (discussing liability as premised on actual knowledge of fraud by both the 
Bank and its employees). 
 110. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 111. See id.  
 112. See supra notes 60–70 and accompanying text.  
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tented with the critical disparity between the rich and the poor, and 
their motivations focus partly on the big banks and financial institu-
tions which should blamed for some part of the fiscal melt down.113 
Looking solely at the mortgage crisis, I focus on the victim impact.  
In this Article, I drew a comparison between the harm caused by 
mortgage fraud and the harm that results from drug distribution net-
works.114  Many of the harms suffered by the affected communities 
are comparable, and I urge a new view of white collar crime that 
would discard the language that prevents us from treating the harm 
similarly.115  As we continue to use terms that minimize the impact of 
certain types of white collar offenses, our approach to addressing the-
se crimes will retain the vestiges of the language differentiation.  This 
is one of the rallying cries of those who Occupy Wall Street, both here 
and across the globe. 
It is not easy to prosecute those responsible for mortgage fraud, 
and I do not mean to suggest otherwise here.  Rather, I compare the 
governmental response to the S&L crisis in the 1980s as an example 
of quick and appropriate disposition of some of the key players.116  As 
we know, the S&L crisis had some of the same devastating conse-
quences for home ownership and communities as we are witnessing 
today.  Perhaps if we recognize the crimes as real crimes, the investi-
gative response would be more appropriate and address the wide-
spread destruction that the housing crisis is inflicting today.  Moreo-
ver, the collective knowledge doctrine, used successfully in Bank of 
New England, is a viable theory to address criminal mortgage fraud. 
 
 113. See OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 1. 
 114. See supra notes 85–106 and accompanying text.  
 115. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra Part V. 
